# Core Tools: The Alphabet Soup of APQP, PPAP, FMEA, SPC and MSA



Jd Marhevko – Accuride Corporation, SVP QLMS Shainin Medalist, ASQ Fellow, CSSBB, CMQ/OE, CQE, STEP Awardee ASQ World Conference – Session T12 – May 1, 2018




# The FIVE Core Tools




- APQP: Advance Product Quality Planning: Guidelines for a product quality plan to develop a product or service that satisfies the customer
- 2. FMEA: Failure Modes and Effect Analysis: Methodology used to ensure potential problems have been considered and addressed throughout the product and process development process (Ex. APQP). Traditionally includes the Control Plan (CP)
- **3. PPAP: Production Part Approval Process:** Ensures product consistently meets customer engineering specification requirements during production run at the quoted production rate
- 4. MSA: Measurement Systems Analysis: Guidelines for assessing the quality of a measurement system where readings are replicated
- **5. SPC: Statistical Process Control:** Basic graphing statistical tools that enable process control and capability for continual improvement



### **Other Sample Manuals**



-		SURFACE	SAE	400 000000	
1	TY THE WAT I ON AL	RECOMMENDED PRACTICE	Next 115 Texter 115	147	
	Potential Pallans Bieds and I Processed (Process 7802.0.)	ing b'Bock Analysis it Gauge (s Mark Analysis it Randalaning And Polinska Parkes Mede und C almeny (Radalata) (MEA)	and Leasendry		
η.	1008-Deneta Michaelan				VDA
**	Unphrise-Tre SAS Repared and P Magniforty.org. and General Model (1)		aren Croate Casa	and the	Quality Man
	The populary intracces 24 to 1 if y particular in the opposition of the sector		ayaa ("Mila) ara y	the prove	in the Auton
	An Padlary food on the steppy where pressed. An explosion factors per rests where the to part internety and	Section 5: the latest added to pro-	vite officialities of a		Quality Assu
12	Recommended Process Fernal-For PADA Cheep FMDA and Process FMD Applications Sectors (Sector 5 when and Epicenet Accords FMEA)	(4) in their hair sealarate sectors.	Pitra Strigtwitt and	remark at	Process Land
	The scanning Pall's or Pall's commu- tioning and Descrived functioning an image, or Alex statistics, "Sering reader, so this serger and anonesing a theory, and the serger and anonesing a theory, and the series of the series."	interate a manufacturing and its	mentory parts that the termination of per-	Late of the local factors	-
	Tanani is whith the bearing it.			e to use the	
		and the second second substances of	training and states		



scape



#### Core Tool *inferences* in ISO/IATF 16949:2016

Core Tool	ISO 9001:2015 (Core Tools NOT Specified)	IATF 16949:2016 (Core Tool Inferred/Referenced)
APQP	<ul> <li>8.1 Operational Planning and Control</li> <li>8.2 Requirements for Products and Services</li> <li>8.3 Design and Development of Products and Services</li> <li>8.4 Control of Externally Provided Processes, Products and Services</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>8.1.1 Operational Planning and Control</li> <li>8.2 Requirements for Products and Services</li> <li>8.3 Design and Development of Products and Services</li> <li>8.4 Control of Externally Provided Processes, Products and Services</li> </ul>
FMEA	<ul> <li>6.1 Actions to Address Risks and Opportunities</li> <li>8.3.5 Design and Development Output</li> <li>9.1. Monitoring, Measurement, Analysis and Evaluation General</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>4.4.1.2 Product Safety</li> <li>6.1 Actions to Address Risks and Opportunities</li> <li>8.3 Design and Develop of Products and Services [8.3.3.3, 8.3.5.1, 8.3.5.2]</li> <li>8.5 Production and Service Provision [8.5.1.1, 8.5.6.1.1]</li> <li>8.7 Control of Non-Conforming Outputs [8.7.1.4, 8.7.1.5]</li> <li>9.1 Monitoring, Measurement, Analysis and Evaluation General</li> </ul>
<b>Q</b> ASQ		<ul> <li>9.2.3 Manufacturing Process Audit</li> <li>10.2 Non-Conformity and Corrective Action [10.2.3, 10.2.4]</li> <li>10.3.1 Continual Improvement</li> </ul>

#### Core Tool inferences in ISO/IATF 16949:2016

Core Tool	ISO 9001:2015 (Core Tools NOT Specified)	IATF 16949:2016 (Core Tool Inferred/Referenced)
CP*	<ul> <li>8.3.5 Design and Development Outputs</li> <li>8.5.1 Control of Production and Service Provision</li> <li>8.6 Release of Products and Services</li> <li>8.7 Control of Non-Conforming Outputs</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>8.3.5.2 Manufacturing Process Design Output</li> <li>8.5 Production and Service Provision [8.5.1.1,</li> <li>8.5.1.3, 8.5.6.1.1]</li> <li>8.6 Release of Products and Services</li> <li>8.7 Control of Non-Conforming Outputs</li> <li>9.1.1.2 Identification of Statistical Tools</li> <li>9.2.2.3 Manufacturing Process Audit</li> <li>10.2.3 Problem Solving</li> <li>Annex A. Control Plan</li> </ul>
PPAP	8.3.4 Design and Development Control	8.3.4.3 Prototype Program 8.3.4.4 Product Approval Process

\*The Control Plan is not considered a "stand alone" Core Tool. Usually paired with the P-FMEA



#### Core Tool *inferences* in ISO/IATF 16949:2016


Core Tool	ISO 9001:2015 (Core Tools NOT Specified)	IATF 16949:2016 (Core Tool Inferred/Referenced)
SPC	9.1 Monitoring, Measurement, Analysis and Evaluation	8.3.5.2 Manufacturing Process Design Output 8.6.4 Verification & Acceptance of Conformity 9.1 Monitoring, Measurement, Analysis and Evaluation
MSA	7.1.5 Monitoring and Measurement Resources	<ul> <li>7.1.5 Monitoring and Measuring Resources</li> <li>7.1.5.1.1 MSA</li> <li>7.1.5.2.1 Calibration/Verification Records</li> <li>7.1.5.3 Laboratory Requirements</li> <li>8.6.3 Appearance Items (inference)</li> </ul>





#### APQP

#### **Advanced Product Quality Planning**






What is it: The management of **Product Development** 

Why do we need it: To understand what our customer wants and to fulfill those wants

**How is it done**: Across a prescriptive "Five-Stage", "Gated" or "Phased" approach. Other iterations exist and are also used so long as the foundational five are in place. The process is required to be cross-functional in its development and execution




# The Typical APQP Stages/Phases



### **APQP Plan & Define Phase**

Typical Inputs	Typical Outputs
VOC Data	Design goals
Marketing Strategy	Reliability/Quality Goals
Product/Process Assumptions	Preliminary Critical Characteristics
Customer Inputs	Preliminary Process Flow
Compliance Criteria	Preliminary BOM
Etc.	Etc.






#### **APQP Product Design & Development Phase**

#### **Program Approval**


Design Outputs	APQP Outputs
DFMEA	New Equipment/Tooling
Design for Mfg/Asm	New Facility Needs
Design Verification	Gage/Test Requirements
Prototype Built	Final Critical Characteristics
Eng Drawings/Specs	Etc.
Etc.	





#### **APQP Product Design & Development Phase**

Prototype Outputs								
Pkg Standards/Specs	MSA/AAA							
Product/Process Review	Management Support							
Process Flow Chart	Cp/Cpk Plan							
Floor Plan	Work Instructions							
PFMEA/DCP	Etc.							






#### APQP Product & Process Validation Phase

Pilot. Sample Outputs							
Significant Production Run	Packaging/Preservation						
MSA/AAA	Production Control						
Cp/Cpk Studies	Quality Sign-Offs						
PPAP Completion	Management Support						
Product Validation Testing	Etc.						






#### APQP Feedback, Assessment & CAPA Phase

Launch Outputs						
Reduced Variation						
Improved Customer Satisfaction						
Improved Delivery/Service						
Lessons Learned						
Standard Work Updates						
Etc.						







#### Design FMEA Design Failure Mode Effects Analysis

Subsystem: 1	mated Wafer D //deo Display wing: XYZ-12				_		_	B	_				Date 1 S Prepared b	hès	£ )	K of	fx)
Subsystem/ Module & Function	Potential Failure Mode	Potential Local Effect(s) of Faiture	Potential End Effect(s) of Failure				000	Current Controls/Fault Detection	DET	RPN	Recommended Action(s)	Areal/Individual Responsible & Completion Date(s)	Actions Taken	SEV	000	ε	p
të-inch Color Montor	Losa of video	Unable to display operator to input	Loss of text and graphical data representation	6		CRY component failure	2	Leas d'video	1	10	Recommend the 14-inch monitor be used as a backup to provide operator interface. However, graphical data representation will become degraded due to the loss of high resolution.	(software) will	Not accepted by the Reliability Review Team See report ABC-XX1			1	1.
				6		Graphics PCB failure	3	System alert	0	5	Recommend a 16- inch monitor be replaced for the existing 14-inch monitor; so that complete redundancy will exist.	Mr. X. (electrical) and Mr. Y. (software) will evaluate proposed configuration by MMDD/YY.	Not accepted by the Reliability Review Team. See report ABC-XX2		0		5



### ALL Products & Processes Fail

Failure is **ALWAYS** a Design Requirement/Criteria

Determining **HOW** the design will fail, **WHEN** it will fail, and **WHY** it will fail will allow a designer to incorporate failure as an acceptable design constraint

Failure as an ACCEPTABLE design constraint = Customer Satisfaction = Design Quality



# FMEA: Design (D) & Process (P)

What is it: A risk analysis of a part or process

Why do we need it: To identify the functions of a process and the associated potential failure modes, effects and potential causes. The vision is to prevent problems from occurring so that defects are not incurred and no one gets hurt. It is used to evaluate if the current planned actions are sufficient and effective

**How is it done**: Via the utilization of a cross-functional team approach. Multiple iterations exist across industry. Within IATF, the process is required to be cross-functional in its development and execution. It is considered a "Risk-Based Thinking" (RBT) tool. It often incorporates results from other methods such as SPC, MSA, Fault Tree Analysis, etc.



### **FMEAS for Products & Processes**

There are three (3) basic cases in which an FMEA is applied:

- 1. New designs, new technology or new process
- 2. New application of existing design or process
- 3. Changes to an existing design or process
- Design FMEA: A technique which analyzes system functions within a defined boundary to address possible design weakness and potential risks of failure. DFMEA data is used in the creation of the PFMEA
- Process FMEA: A technique which analyzes processes that can impact quality. These processes may be: Receiving, Handling, Manufacturing, Assembly, Storage, Transportation, Maintenance, Repair and Communication



# Six (6) Steps of an FMEA (D or P)




- Define Scope. Identify what is to included in the evaluation. (System, Sub-system, Component). Include relevant Lessons Learned (LL) and reference materials. Manage the five (5) T's:
  - 1. Team: Who will constitute the core team
  - 2. Timing: When is it due. Gantt, lay-out timing plan
  - **3. inTent:** Why is the team there; Ensure skills/training
  - **4. Tool:** What reporting methodology will be used? Excel, Software, etc



5. Task: What work needs to be done across the six steps. Consider inclusion of effective documentation for auditing and customer review

Define	System	Function	Failure	Risk	Optimiza	$\backslash$
Scope	Analysis	Analysis	Analysis	Analysis	-tion	

- 2. Conduct System Analysis: Define the customer(s) wrt End Users, Assembly, Manufacturing, etc.
  - 1. Identify and break down the design into system, sub-system, component and parts for functional risk analysis. Note: A component FMEA is a subset of a system FMEA. Ex. A brake pad is a component of a brake assembly which is a sub-system of the chassis
  - Visualize the system via block (boundary) and/or structure tree diagrams



$\overline{\ }$	Define	System	Function	Failure	Risk	/	Optimiza	$\overline{\ }$
	Scope	Analysi	s Analysis	Analysis	Analysis		-tion	

- **3. Conduct Function Analysis:** Insures that the specified and required functions are appropriately allocated to the system elements. A function describes WHAT the item/ system element is intended to do.
  - 1. Associates functions with the pertinent system elements

2. Overviews the functionality of the product

- 3. May describe functions in detail. May need to consider interfaces and clearances wrt physical connections, material exchange, energy transfer and data exchange
- 4. Allocates requirements/characteristics to individual functions



5. Cascades internal/external customer functions with associated requirements for intended use

	Define Scope	>	System Analysis	>	Function Analysis	>	Failure Analysis	>	Risk Analysis	$\geq$	Optimiza -tion	>
--	-----------------	---	--------------------	---	----------------------	---	---------------------	---	------------------	--------	-------------------	---

 Conduct Failure Analysis: Identify failure causes, modes, and effects, and show their relationships to enable risk assessment.

Failure effects are the consequence of a failure mode

- 1. Identification of potential failures assigned to functions in structural elements
- 2. Visualize failure relationships (FMEA spreadsheet)
- 3. Collaborate between the customer and suppler on effects





Define System Function	Failure	Risk	Optimiza
Scope Analysis Analysis	Analysis	Analysis	-tion


- 5. Conduct Risk Analysis. Prioritize the risks by evaluating Severity (how bad), Occurrence (how often) and Detection (how well can we find it). Aka SOD. Each is on a scale of 1-10. The multiplication of S x O x D is the RPN
  - 1. A Risk Priority Number (RPN) is determined
  - 2. Based on the RPN, assign preventive controls which provide information/guidance as an input to the design
  - 3. Assign detective controls to verify and validate procedures previously demonstrated to detect the failure
  - 4. Completed SOD assessment
  - 5. Collaboration between customer and supplier on Severity




# **RPN**, Criticality or Prioritization

Each method of evaluation has pros and cons. There is a change in process towards an "Action Prioritization" (AP) matrix which may incorporate Criticality (S\*O). **RPN will be eliminated as a method of risk evaluation (AIAG, 2018)** 

AIAG currently references the SOD tables found in the FMEA "Blue Book". Many organizations have evolved to their own form of prioritization tables based on their own logic





### 4<sup>th</sup> Ed SOD Summary for Design FMEA

NOTE: OEs & Other businesses often use their own SOD tables. This is a MODEL

#	Severity Criteria	Occurrence Criteria	Opportunity for Detection
10	Failure to meet safety and/or regulatory requirements. Potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves non-compliance with government regulation without warning	Very high. New technology/new design with no history. >= 1 per 10	No detection opportunity: No current design control. Cannot detect or is not analyzed. Detection is almost impossible
9	Failure to meet safety and/or regulatory requirements. Potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves non-compliance with government regulation with warning	High. Failure is inevitable with new design, new application or change in duty cycle/operating conditions. 1 in 20	Not likely to detect at any stage. Design analysis/detection controls have a weak detection capability. Virtual analysis is not correlated to expected actual operating conditions. Detection is very remote
8	Loss or degradation of primary function. Loss of primary function	High. Failure is likely with new design, new application or change in duty cycle/operating conditions. 1 in 50	Post design freeze and prior to launch. Product verification/validation after design freeze and prior to launch with pass/fail testing. Detection is remote
7	Loss or degradation of primary function. Degradation of primary function	High. Failure is uncertain with new design, new application or change in duty cycle/operating conditions. 1 in 100	Post design freeze and prior to launch. Product verification/validation after design freeze and prior to launch with test to failure testing. Detection is very low
6	Loss or degradation of secondary function. Loss of secondary function	Moderate. Frequent failures associated with similar designs or in design simulation and testing. 1 in 500	Post design freeze and prior to launch. Product verification/validation after design freeze and prior to launch with degradation testing. Detection is low
5	Loss or degradation of secondary function. Degradation of secondary function	Moderate. Occasional failures associated with similar designs or in design simulation and testing. 1 in 2,000	Prior to design freeze. Product verification/validation after design freeze and prior to launch with pass/fail testing. Detection is moderate
4	Annoyance. Appearance or audible noise, vehicle operable, item does not conform and noticed by most customers (>75%)	Moderate. Isolated failures associated with similar designs or in design simulation and testing. 1 in 10,000	Prior to design freeze. Product verification/validation after design freeze and prior to launch with test to failure testing. Detection is moderately high
3	Annoyance. Appearance or audible noise, vehicle operable, item does not conform and noticed by many customers (>50%)	Low. Only isolated failures associated with almost identical design or in design simulation testing. 1 in 100,000	Prior to design freeze. Product verification/validation after design freeze and prior to launch with degradation testing. Detection is high
2	Annoyance. Appearance or audible noise, vehicle operable, item does not conform and noticed by discriminating customers (<25%)	Low. No observed failures associated with almost identical design or in design simulation testing. 1 in 100,000,000	Virtual analysis correlated. Design analysis/detection controls have a strong detection capability. Virtual analysis is highly correlated with actual or expected operating conditions prior to design freeze. Detection is very high
1	No discernable affect	Very low. Failure is eliminated through preventive control	Detection not applicable; failure prevention. Failure cause or failure mode can not occur because it is fully prevented through design solutions. Detection is almost certain

PFMEA 4<sup>th</sup> Edition. 2008. Chrysler LLC, Ford Motor Company, General Motors Corporation

$\overline{\}$	Define	System	Function	Failure	Risk	/	Optimiza	
	Scope	Analysis	Analysis	Analysis	Analysis		-tion	


- Evaluate for Optimization. The planning and execution of actions to mitigate risk and assess the effectiveness of those actions
  - 1. Identify necessary actions
  - 2. Assign responsibilities and timing
  - 3. Confirmation of effectiveness of the actions taken
  - 4. Continuous improvement of the design

Multiple other types of FMEA applications: System, Concept, Environmental/Safety, Machinery, Software, etc.



## **DFMEA Sample Format**

DFMEA formats vary widely based on OE criteria and independent company expectations...Even though the AIAG will add ~8-10 more columns to the current standard, the general approach and intent will be the same; mitigate risk through failure analysis



## Other DFMEA Sources...

- <u>http://quality-one.com/fmea/design-fmea/</u>
- <u>http://www.isixsigma.com/dictionary/dfmea/</u>
- <u>http://www.qmii.com/LT-</u> <u>133%20ISO%209001\_2015%20Risk%20Based%20Thinking.pdf</u>
- <u>http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso31000.htm</u> (ISO Risk Management)
- 86 Minute Video...very detailed
   <u>http://www.isixsigma.com/tools-templates/design-of-experiments-doe/mark-kiemele-interview/</u>
- AIAG APQP for DFMEA Checklist (2nd ed)





#### Process FMEA & CP PFMEA + Control Plan = Dynamic Control

Subsystem: 1	mated Wafer D Adeo Display Wing XYZ-12			IVIK	de and Erre	cts	Analysis (I	- M	EA	): System Fi	ALA .	Date: S Prepared t	Shee	it.	X o	fΧ
Subsystem/ Module & Function	Potential Failure Mode	Potential Local Effect(s) of Faiture	Potential End Effect(s) of Failure			0 0 0	Current Controls/Fault Detection		RPN	Recommended Action(s)	Areal/Individual Responsible & Completion Date(s)	Actions Taken	E V	C	DET	3
të-inch Goler Montor	Loss of video	Unable to display operator's input	Loss of text and graphical data representation	0	CRY component failure		Loos of video	-1	12	Recommend the 14-inch monitor be used as a backup to provide operator interface. However, graphical duta representation will become degraded due to the loss of high resolution.	(software) will evaluate suggested configuration by MM/DD/YY	Not accepted by the Reliabity Review Team See report ABC-XX1			1	1
				6	Graphics PCB failure	-	System alert		54	Recommend a 16- inch mondar be replaced for the existing 14-inch montor; so that complete redundancy will exist.	Mr. X. (electrical) and Mr. Y. (software) will evaluate proposed configuration by MM/DD/YY.	Not accepted by the Reliability Review Team. See report ABC-XX2	6	0		10



### What is a DCP

A DCP is a blended format of a PFMEA and CP. It leverages the common columns in both tools and enables "linear" thinking across the analysis of an individual process step

#### It saves time and increases the security of the system

- A PFMEA defines, identifies, prioritizes, and eliminates known and/or potential process failures from reaching the customer. The goal is to eliminate Failure Modes and reduce their risks
- A CP follows the PFMEA steps and provides details on how the "potential issues" are checked for in the process
- A DCP is a living document which helps to prevent problems
- It saves time and increases process security



### A DCP

A DCP lists a sequence of tasks used to produce a product or provide a service by combining the PFMEA and CP. It:

- 1. Identifies process related Failure Modes before they occur
- 2. Determines the Effect & Severity of these failure modes
- 3. Identifies the **Causes** and probability of **Occurrence** of the failure modes
- 4. Identifies the **Controls** and their **Effectiveness**
- 5. Quantifies the **Risks** associated with the failure modes
- 6. Develops and documents **Action Plans** to reduce the risks
- 7. Identifies the Type & Effectiveness of the Gaging system
- 8. Determines the necessary Inspection Frequency



### FMEA & CP in One Format

				La								1-		
Plant				Part/Product Name	1			Customer PN					r PN/Revision/Date	
	Address			XXX				XXX				XXX		01/01/00
	Site Address Process					PN:		Flow Chart #						
Site	Address			XXX				XXX		XXX		XXX		01/01/00
				Prototype (X) F	Pre-Launch (X) F	Productic	n ( <b>X</b> )							
	Product/Proces	s Characteristics		Potential F	ailures and Effects		Causes of Failu	ıre	Curre	ent Controls				
	Char. or Process		SC	Failure	Effects of				Control - Detect	Control Method to				Responsible
No.	Desc	Characteristic	Class	Mode	Failure	SEV	Cause	OCC	Failure Mode	Prevent Cause	DET	RPN	Recommendations	Person/Timing
110.													Recommendations	r cisor/ ming
					1							0		
-					1					1		0		
						-						0		
												0		
												0		
												0		
												0		
												0		
												0		
												0		
												0		
												0		
												0		
												0		
					1							0		
						1						0		
					+	-						0		
					+	-						0		
•	В	с	D	E	F	G	н			к		M	N	0
Α	B	<u>ر</u>	D	E	F	G	п		J	n n	L	IVI	N	U

The format is completed linearly from A – AA. This ensures inclusion of a gaging system review and eliminates the need to manage 2 forms



\*\*Many sites modify the format to fit their own needs

#### CP "Side" P - AA

Dynamic Co "C" "B" "A" (Rolling top	ontrol Plan (I 01/01/00 01/01/00 01/01/00 3 levels)		on/Date	Core Team: XXX Design Eng XXX Mfg Eng XXX Other XXX Prod Mgr DCP File Number: XXX							
Orig SEV	New OCC	New DET	New RPN 0	Ctrl Fctr	OWI#	Tool Fxt #	Gage Desc/ Gage No.	GRR & Date	Insp Freq	Cpk & Date	Reaction Plans
0 0 0			0 0 0								
0 0 0			0 0 0								
0 P	Q	R	0 <b>S</b>	Т	U	v	W	x	Y	Z	AA

# A Practice DCP

#### The fit of a marker cap...

- 1. Look at the cap and barrel of a writing marker
- 2. Review the step of assembling the cap onto the barrel
- 3. Complete relevant lines of the DCP wrt assembly
- 4. There can be two general failure modes:
  - a. The cap fits with an audible "click" and stays firmly in place. It does NOT easily pull off
  - b. The cap does not stay secure and falls off
- 5. Each failure mode will have its own "DCP Stream" of information
- 6. Follow across the format and complete the information
- 7. Work in teams across the format






### 4<sup>th</sup> Ed SOD Summary for Process FMEA

NOTE: OEs & Other businesses often use their own SOD tables. This is a MODEL

#	Severity Criteria (Customer Effect)	Occurrence	Opportunity for Detection
10	Failure to meet safety and/or regulatory requirements. Potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves non-compliance with government regulation without warning	Very high. >= 1 per 10	No detection opportunity: No current process control. Cannot detect or is not analyzed. Detection is almost impossible
9	Failure to meet safety and/or regulatory requirements. Potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves non-compliance with government regulation with warning	High. 1 in 20	Not likely to detect at any stage. Failure mode and/or Cause is not easily detected. Detection is very remote
8	Loss or degradation of primary function. Does not affect safe vehicle operation	High. 1 in 50	Problem detection post processing. Failure mode detection post processing by operator through visual, tactile, or audible means. Detection is remote
7	Loss or degradation of primary function. Degradation of primary function. Vehicle operable at reduced level of performance	High. 1 in 100	Problem detection at source. Failure mode detection in-station by operator through visual, tactile, or audible means or post-processing through attribute gaging. Detection is very low
6	Loss or degradation of secondary function. Vehicle operable but convenience/comfort functions inoperable	Moderate. 1 in 500	Problem detection post processing. Failure mode detection post-processing by operator through use of variable gaging or in-station by operator through use of attribute gaging. Detection is low
5	Loss or degradation of secondary function. Vehicle operable but convenience/comfort functions at reduced levels of performance	Moderate. 1 in 2,000	Problem detection at source. Failure mode or error detection in-station by operator through use of variable gaging or by automated controls in–station that will detect issue and notify operator. Gaging performed on setup and 1 <sup>st</sup> pc check. Detection is moderate
4	Annoyance. Appearance or audible noise, vehicle operable, item does not conform and noticed by most customers (>75%)	Moderate. 1 in 10,000	Problem detected post processing. Failure mode detection post-processing by automated controls that will detect discrepant part and lock part to prevent further processing. Detection is moderately high
3	Annoyance. Appearance or audible noise, vehicle operable, item does not conform and noticed by many customers (>50%)	Low. 1 in 100,000	Problem detection at source. Failure mode detection in-station by automated controls that will detect discrepant part and automatically lock part in station to prevent further processing. Detection is high
2	Annoyance. Appearance or audible noise, vehicle operable, item does not conform and noticed by discriminating customers (<25%)	Low. 1 in 100,000,000	Error detection and/or problem prevention. Error cause detection in station by automated controls that will detect error and prevent discrepant part from being made. Detection is very high
1	No discernable affect	Very low. Failure is eliminated through preventive control	Detection not applicable; error prevention. Error cause prevention as a result of fixture/machine/part design. Discrepant parts cannot be made due to error proofing. Detection is almost certain


PFMEA 4<sup>th</sup> Edition. 2008. Chrysler LLC, Ford Motor Company, General Motors Corporation

### For Want of A Horse



# **DCP or Fire-Fight?**

#### **Planning vs Fire-Fighting**






Total time is *area under the curve*...Estimated monies are 7:1 with OT, Freight, Material/Equipment changes, T&E, etc. Leverage the DCP to minimize fire-fighting after release. Partner with functional teams

### Case Study: Before/After DCP

Initial release and after DCP implementation of 3 products. Was planning secondary to firefighting? What kinds of losses were likely incurred? Was it worth it?





#### PPAP Production Part Approval Process

Ety Mari	Par Partos
Satur wear	- PE PURO
Covernment Regulation [] THL [] No. Engineering Driver	g Change Lave Dated
Additional Engineering Changes	Dated
States or Dealing He Prohase	Geter Ke Weget (re)
Chebing did No Engineering One	ap Level Dead
SEPPLER MANUACTURING INTORMOSI	DESCRIPTION INTERACTION
Barlo Sono & Barlo Coly	Densiral District Posterio Approx
	Costernar NameDidolan
that latture	tuye/fuye Cole
	Assimution
Ob 200 DE	
Next: Deserve participation are realisable or reportable extensions.	□ THE □ THE
An pairs partness to entry up opening the heating same	D 746 D 766
PRAEDA FOR EURAREDON	Change to Spherel Construction of Westal
Engineering throught	Sub-Supplier or Material Source Change
Tooling, Teacher, Replacement, Relationary, or additional	Overga in Part Pasenting
Lancia d litergany	Parts Protectori se lietitional Lanavier
Toolog Inselier a liter 1 proc	Citier - please specify
RECONSTRUCTOR STUDIESTING LEAVES, (Check and Leavel 1 – Minuted may load for the physical appropriate support of the sequence	ulerited to pudarers. I upprime to pudarers.
1408/06/06 #15/0.79	
The results for descentional menagements ended and familie These results even al description specification requirements The Model-Costly (Productor Parsons	od inda 🗌 approximate alimita 🗋 statinitad proxima padage 🗌 9:3 — (8:5421 Daplanulite Respired)
ODDAM/COM I social affini facility sociale represented in the memory on species and Production/Production Process Mercus in Distance Sequences. I factor production of the production and of finances and other productions are production and of	of any net three outgoins any t
LIPLANARNICAMENTS	
The Mark	
Reptire Autorited Egenture	Cair
Pon Calification Laws Laws Dispersion Disper	Part Function Address: URD Part Function
Cutorier Naria Butorier Bar	
W/ CFG-1001 Telesmonistic moneyee	KINE MARK & N. LIGHTER MODEL . CONTRACTOR



### PPAP

What is it: Requirements for approval of production parts

Why do we need it: To make sure that we understand all of the customer requirements, and that we can meet them under actual production conditions

**How is it done**: Based on customer direction, there are 5 levels of PPAP to secure product approval. An application "cover sheet" is called a Product Sample Warrant (PSW) which lists 18-20 different types of evidence that may be required for submission. These can be customer and/or product/process dependent. It is typical for a customer to witness a launch and review PPAP records when on-site



### PPAP Levels per AIAG 4<sup>th</sup> ed.

- 1. Warrant only for appearance items
- 2. Warrant with product samples and limited supporting data
- 3. Warrant with product samples and complete supporting data
- 4. Warrant with other requirements specified by the customer
- 5. Warrant with product samples and complete supporting data reviewing at the supplier's manufacturing location

PPAP level details are typically arranged in advance with the supplier and customer and will often depend on whether the product is a new design or another revision of a tried and true process



### **PPAP Components**

- 1. Design records
- 2. Authorized Engineering Change documents
- 3. Customer engineering approval
- 4. Design FMEA
- 5. Process flow diagrams
- 6. Process FMEA
- 7. Control Plan
- 8. MSA Studies
- 9. Dimensional results
- 10. Material/performance test 20. Special process audit



results

- 11. Initial process study
- 12. Qualified lab documentation
- 13. Appearance approval report
- 14. Sample production parts
- 15. Master samples
- 16. Checking aids
- 17. Customer specific requirements (CSR) records 18. **PSW**
- 19. Bulk material requirements checklist
- results

### PPAP Prep...All Hands on Deck

- 1. TAKES TIME and attention to DETAIL
- 2. Requires a cross-functional team
- 3. Insure a good understanding of the Customer Specific Requirements (CSRs) in advance
- 4. Do WELL on the Appearance Approval Reports (AARs). While the easiest "up front", these are often the most expensive later on. Take the time to develop boundary samples and conduct Attribute Agreement Analysis (AAAs) to ensure skill
- 5. Attend to the full Measurement System Analysis (MSA) on variables metrics. Include calibration, resolution and GRR
- 6. Enable sufficient lead time for the DFMEA, FMEA and CP
- 7. Insure statistical control of significant characteristics



### How to Organize

- 1. Many customers will dictate submission formats
- 2. Some companies establish binders/books
- 3. Some use formal organizing software


It is critical that:


- 1. More than 1 person has access/passwords
- 2. Proper security is enabled across those individuals
- 3. Proper revisions are sustained/maintained





#### Cp/Cpk/Pp/Ppk Process Capability Primer







### Process Capability 101

- Cp/Cpk: Also called "short term" capability which is used to reliably determine if a process is yielding good initial results by taking a representative sample size.
  - Cp is based on the whole breadth of the processCpk is based on "half" of the process
- Pp/Ppk: Also known as "long term" process capability. The key difference is that there is




much more data on hand for Pp/Ppk. AIAG notes "90 shifts, 90 days"

### **Dissecting the Bell**

Lower Spec Limit

**Upper Spec Limit** 




### **Calculating Capability**

**Cp (Pp)**. Measures the ability of the WHOLE bell to fit within the target limits

If the whole bell (6 sigmas) fit within the target limits a total of 1 time, then the Cp = 1. Ideally, 2 is preferred.

$$Cp = (USL - LSL) / (6 \times \sigma)$$

USL = 6, LSL = 0,  $\sigma = 1$ 




**Cpk (Ppk)**. Measures the ability of HALF of a bell (3 sigmas) to fit within the average and the closest target limit

$$Cpk_U = (USL - Average) / (3 x \sigma)$$
  
 $Cpk_L = (Average - LSL) / (3 x \sigma)$ 

$$USL = 6$$
,  $LSL = 0$ ,  $\sigma = 1$ 

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{Cp} &= (6-0) \ / \ (6 \ x \ \sigma) = 1 \\ \text{Cpk}_{\text{U}} &= (6-5) \ / \ (3 \ x \ \sigma) = 1 \ / 3 \ (0.33) \\ \text{Cpk}_{\text{L}} &= (5-0) \ / \ (3 \ x \ \sigma) = 1 \ 2 \ / 3 \ (1.67) \end{array}$$




### **Cpk Worksheet**

Determine the Cp and Cpk for each situation...Remember, if the process is NOT shaped like a bell, then sigma cannot be used (without special consideration) and the Cp/Cpk cannot be properly determined

In each case either the average or sigma may or may not change... only the specifications remain the same

#	Avg	σ	Ср	Cpk <sub>U</sub>	Cpk <sub>L</sub>	%Non-Conf
1	5.0	2.50				
2	5.0	1.67				
3	7.5	0.83				
4	5.0	0.83				




### Shift Happens

Cpk of 2 is desired for *initial* capability

<u>Long term</u> capability is Ppk. This is the capability after the process experiences "life" via multiple material lot changes, set up and operator variation, seasonality, etc. Ppk is usually calculated after "90 days" (or with a significant quantity) of process data. It is the type of product results that the *long term* process will represent

It is estimated that a process will "shift" by +/-1.5 $\sigma$  in response to those changes. As such, if a process started ideally with a Cpk of 2.00, then it is estimated that the resultant Ppk would be 1.33 to accommodate these types of affects







#### MSA (GRR & AAA) Measurement Systems Analysis





### Measurement System Analysis

When we measure or make an assessment of the goodness of an item, we need to be sure that our result is correct. If it is not correct, we take two risks:


- Alpha α Risk: We may inadvertently discard or rework a good item (Aw, darn)
- Beta ß Risk: We may inadvertently pass on a bad item (Boy, that was Bad)



## Why Do We Need to Know?

We need to know how much error there is in our measurement processes for several reasons:

- Prevent  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  errors
- Reduce scrap/rework
- Understand what process Cp/Cpk we need our processes to have
- It is our JOB to ensure that our people are enabled to make the right pass/fail decision <u>EVERY</u> time



- And of course...it is an inherent part of PPAP
- NOTE: EVERY item called out for measure or inspection on a control plan is <u>REQUIRED</u> to have an MSA analysis conducted.

# MSA Types: Variable & Attribute

Humans usually believe what they see and do not question a value shown on an instrument. There are <u>two typical types</u> of variables MSA used to determine the percentage of results error:

- Crossed Gage R&R (Repeatability & Reproducibility): One instrument, multiple operators and multiple part samples
- Nested GR&R. Used for gage error in destructive testing

There is <u>generally one type</u> of Attribute MSA to determine HOW right or wrong we are in our results:


 Attributes Agreement Analysis (AAA) is used for items we assess visually or by go/no go or needs to be categorized



Is this window broken? It still opens. The wooden frame is in place



### **How Data Varies**



**Accuracy**: Generally managed by **calibration** includes bias (how far off), linearity (across the breadth of the measured range) and stability (holding a measure over time)

**Precision**: Generally managed by Repeatability (gage) and Reproducibility (human) aka **GR&R** 



### **General MSA Notes**


For a variables Measurement System to work, three features are <u>equally</u> needed:

- Resolution: Ability to read the gage. (Discrimination). Resolution needs to be at least 10% of the tolerance (If not at 10% or better, additional actions are needed)
- Calibration: A check of bias, linearity and stability (performed on a regular basis)
- GR&R: Amount of error in human and gage performance. Typical GR&R <= 10% error on safety features. Included in PPAP, it insures that the gage system will work as intended BEFORE the process is launched. After that, it is conducted



on an as needed basis (verification of process, gage system change, qualification of personnel)

#### Resolution and Cpk What does Resolution do for you?




With a "10% resolution gage", we would accept a unit that reads 10. But...it could be a 9 or an 11. We are at risk 1/3 of the time for a  $\beta$  error...IF the Cp/Cpk is 1

We would also reject an 11, (it could be a 10 or 12). We could have an  $\alpha$  error 1/3 of the time...Again, **IF the Cp/Cpk is 1** 



This is one of several reasons why a Cp/Cpk of 1 isn't good enough for safety features

### Resolution With Cpk >1.33 Resolution with better process capability



With a more capable process, if we still have a "10% gage", the process is not likely to generate any units measuring a "10". As such, if we read an 8, it could still be a 7 or 9. However, there is now minimal risk for either an  $\alpha$  or  $\beta$  error. In this case, the Cp/Cpk is 1.33

#### This is one of several reasons of why a minimum Cp/Cpk of 1.33 is required for safety features

Attribute Agreement Analysis AAA Checks for the chances of 100% agreement on three features:

- Within "myself"; Did I repeatedly call it good or bad in a consistent manner (even if I was wrong)
- Between both me and "my peer"; Did both my peer and I repeatedly call it good or bad in a consistent manner (even if we were both wrong)

	<b>I</b>				•	<u> </u>		<u> </u>	
Known Population		Operator #1		Operator #2		Operator #3		Y/N	Y/N
Sample #	Attribute	Try #1	Try #2	Try #1	Try #2	Try #1	Try #2	Agree	Agree
1	pass	pass	pass	pass	fail	fail	fail	Ν	N
2	pass	pass	pass	pass	pass	fail	fail	N	N
3	fail	fail	fail	fail	pass	pass	pass	N	N
4	fail	fail	fail	fail	fail	fail	fail	Y	Y
5	fail	fail	fail	fail	fail	fail	fail	Y	Y
6	pass	pass	pass	pass	pass	pass	pass	Y	Y

Compared to "Standard"; Did I/we get it right

### **AAA Quick Notes**

An AAA needs many Pass/Fail "Samples"; Preferably 50 or more (pass/fail/borderline). **NOTE:** One unit might have several samples on it An AAA is a check for accuracy in human performance. The target for "Statistical Agreement" is  $\geq 85\%$ . Another form of Agreement is called Kappa (K). AIAG calls out for K >= 75%. AAA is done as a part of PPAP to ensure that the review process will work as intended; before the process is launched. It should be treated as a "maintenance" action with regular review to keep human assessors "calibrated". Usually quarterly

### AAA: What It Looks Like


AAA Gives a series of graphs to show how the operators perform in general. While 100% agreement is not feasible, (like 0% GRR Error), industry norm is 85% for **Statistical Agreement** 

	Screen % Effective Score vs Attribute <sup>4</sup>			
Total Inspected		25		
# in Agreement		17		
95% UCL		85.1%		
Calculated Score		68.0%		
95% LCL		46.5%		

Not an effective Statistical Agreement at < 85% This team will be in statistical agreement about 68% of the time.




However, 95% of the time, they will likely range from 47% in agreement to 85%





#### SPC Statistical Process Control





### What's Normal?

There are 6 main causes of <u>Normal Variation</u> for almost any type of process...

This is <u>NORMAL</u>. Hence the "normal" or Gaussian distribution.

Ma npower Ma chine Ma terial



Me thod Me asurement

**E** nvironment

### SPC; High Level Guidelines

- 1. SPC applies to both variables and attributes. It is a graphbased statistical method to analyze and control a process
- 2. First step is to **insure MSA effectiveness**; whether for variables (GRR) or attributes (AAA)
- 3. For variables, must **insure that the process is capable** FIRST, prior to establishing a control chart (Cpk >= 1.33)
- 4. Determine any key patterns (common sense control) that are meaningful to your process and train to those conditions. These typically include: Shifts, Trends, Points outside of the limits
- 5. After that, **it's a go/no go chart**. The graphs help you to know when the processes change (whether desired or not)



### After GRR & Cpk; Now We Can Chart

Moving X and Range chart plots data across time along with its corresponding ranges. Patterns are reviewed for prevention purposes.


Most Common Signals:


- 5 or more points above or below the average line is considered a shift (bell has moved)
- 5 or more points continuously increasing or decreasing is considered a trend
- Any point outside of the control limits.

These are considered non-normal patterns and the process spread has likely increased

**NOTE**: Different references call out varying control criteria








X-bar and R charts are PREVENTIVE and PREDICTIVE forms of process management. They give an advanced warning enabling proactive actions

### Pre-Control: No "Limits"

SPC is powerful and effective. Pre-Control is a step before that. It "forces" a 1.33 Cpk by requiring the process to "**pre-act**" when data signals are in-spec but outside of the +/- 3 sigma range. While no control limits need to be calculated, careful communication of **WHY** a person needs to react and adjust the process for an in-spec part




### Attribute Charts; With a Good AAA

**p-chart.** A trend-based percentage chart. Must be paired with a Pareto or checksheet to execute fixes. A p-chart typically follows a Weibull distribution because either 0 or 100 is optimal and a "half bell" is developed with bias towards one end or the other.

**c-chart**. This "counts" defects per unit. Ex. A application may have 3 typos, 2 smudges and 2 areas not filled out for 8 defects on 1 item. The next one may be perfect. The c would equal 4 defects per unit. This is a highly effective method that captures detailed data. It is powerful when paired with a Pareto. Again, checksheets are often used. There is usually a high cost to capture this data. c-charts are usually "turned on/off" to capture a timeframe of data and then rechecked later to verify the effectiveness of the fixes

#### Trends:

- 5 or more points above or below the average line is considered a shift
- 5 or more points continuously increasing or decreasing is considered a trend
- Any point outside of the control limits. Spread has likely increased




p and c Charts describe what happens AFTER the process has occurred. (identifying either scrap/rework). Losses are incurred. The intent of these charts is to see if the corrective actions are working

### **Common Types of SPC Charts**

Chart Type	Primary Usage	What is Charted	Typical Sample Size
X-Bar & R	Routine monitoring of high volume manufacturing processes	Plots the average of the data set and its range	~3 to 6
Individual & Moving Range (IMR)	Used when only sample is possible. Common for transactional (monthly) processes	Plots the value and the moving range of the current and preceding values	One
p-Chart	Routine monitoring of high volume processes where scrap/rework trends are critical	Plots the percent non-conforming	Variable
c-Chart	Used for deeply analyzing non-conformities in a product	Plots the average number of non- conformities in a single unit	Variable

### Where The Alphabets Fit...



### The FIVE Core Tools



- APQP: Advance Product Quality Planning: Guidelines for a product quality plan to develop a product or service that satisfies the customer
- 2. FMEA: Failure Modes and Effect Analysis: Methodology used to ensure potential problems have been considered and addressed throughout the product and process development process (Ex. APQP). Traditionally includes the Control Plan (CP)
- **3. PPAP: Production Part Approval Process:** Ensures product consistently meets customer engineering specification requirements during production run at the quoted production rate
- 4. MSA: Measurement Systems Analysis: Guidelines for assessing the quality of a measurement system where readings are replicated
- **5. SPC: Statistical Process Control:** Basic graphing statistical tools that enable process control and capability for continual improvement





#### **Questions?**

Jd Marhevko Phone: (419) 704-5603 Email: JdMarhevko@AccurideCorp.com